Mechanism design with limited communication : implications for decentralization

• 資料種別: 規格・テクニカルリポート類
• タイトル: Mechanism design with limited communication : implications for decentralization
• 著者・編者: Mookherjee, Dilip; 津曲, 正俊
• 著者標目: Mookherjee, Dilip; 津曲, 正俊
• 出版事項: Keio Economic Society, Keio University
• 出版年月日等: 2010
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2010
• タイトル（掲載誌）: Keio Economic Society discussion paper series
• 巻号年月日等（掲載誌）: 10 6
• 掲載巻: 10
• 掲載号: 6
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 件名標目: communication,mechanism design,decentralization,incentives,principal-agent,organizations
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: 出版タイプ： VoR; type:text; We develop a theory of mechanism design in a principal-multiagent setting with private information, where communication involves costly delay. The need to make production decisions within a time deadline prevents agents from communicating their entire private information to the principal, rendering revelation mechanisms infeasible. Feasible communication protocols allow only finite number of possible messages sent in a finite number of stages. An extension of the `Revenue Equivalence Theorem' is obtained, and used to show that an optimal production allocation can be computed by maximizing virtual profits of the Principal subject to communication constraints alone. In this setting delegation of production decisions to agents strictly dominates centralized production decisions, and decentralized communication protocols dominate centralized ones. The value of decentralizing contracting decisions depends on the ability of the principal to verify messages exchanged between agents.
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• 提供元機関・データベース: 慶應義塾大学 : 慶應義塾大学学術情報リポジトリ