Mechanism design with limited communication : implications for decentralization

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Mookherjee, Dilipほか

Publisher: Keio Economic Society, Keio University

Publication date: 2010

Material Format: Digital

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Note (General)：: type:textWe develop a theory of mechanism design in a principal-multiagent setting with private information, where communication involves costly delay...

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Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Mechanism design with limited communication : implications for decentralization
Author/Editor: Mookherjee, Dilip
津曲, 正俊
Author Heading: Mookherjee, Dilip
津曲, 正俊
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Keio Economic Society, Keio University
Publication Date: 2010
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2010
Periodical title: Keio Economic Society discussion paper series
No. or year of volume/issue: 10 6
Volume: 10
Issue: 6
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: communication,mechanism design,decentralization,incentives,principal-agent,organizations
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): type:text
We develop a theory of mechanism design in a principal-multiagent setting with private information, where communication involves costly delay. The need to make production decisions within a time deadline prevents agents from communicating their entire private information to the principal, rendering revelation mechanisms infeasible. Feasible communication protocols allow only finite number of possible messages sent in a finite number of stages. An extension of the `Revenue Equivalence Theorem' is obtained, and used to show that an optimal production allocation can be computed by maximizing virtual profits of the Principal subject to communication constraints alone. In this setting delegation of production decisions to agents strictly dominates centralized production decisions, and decentralized communication protocols dominate centralized ones. The value of decentralizing contracting decisions depends on the ability of the principal to verify messages exchanged between agents.
Source: https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/download.php?koara_id=AA10715850-00001006-0001
https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/download.php?koara_id=AA10715850-00001006-0001
Access Restrictions: 限定公開
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 慶應義塾大学 : 慶應義塾大学学術情報リポジトリ