The volatility curse : exogenous shocks and representation in resource-rich democracies

• 資料種別: 図書
• ISBN: 9781108841795 hardcover; 1108841791 hardcover; 9781108795357 paperback; 1108795358 paperback
• ISBN（エラーコード）: 9781108898072 electronic book
• タイトル: The volatility curse : exogenous shocks and representation in resource-rich democracies
• 著者・編者: Daniela Campello, Cesar Zucco
• 著者標目: Campello, Daniela, 1970-; Zucco, Cesar, Jr
• 出版事項: Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press (出版)
• 出版年月日等: 2021; 著作権日付 : ©2021
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2021
• 数量: xix, 239 pages
• 形態の詳細: illustrations
• 大きさ: 24 cm
• 出版地（国名コード）: GB
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 表現種別: text
• 機器種別: unmediated
• キャリア種別: volume
• 件名標目: Elections--Economic aspects--Latin America; Voting--Economic aspects--Latin America; Democracy--Economic aspects--Latin America; Democracy--Economic aspects.; Economic history.; Elections--Economic aspects.; Politics and government.; Voting--Economic aspects.; Latin America--Economic conditions; Latin America--Politics and government; Latin America.
• LCC: JL968
• DDC: 324.98
• NDLC: A251
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 資料の内容に関する注記: The Volatility Curse examines the conditions under which economic voting can (and cannot) function as a mechanism of democratic accountability, challenging existing theories that are largely based on experiences in developed democracies. Drawing on cross-national data from around the world and micro-level evidence from Latin America, Daniela Campello and Cesar Zucco make two broad, related arguments. First, they show that economic voting is pervasive around the world, but in economically volatile developing democracies that are dependent on commodity exports and inflows of foreign capital, economic outcomes are highly contingent on conditions beyond government control, which nonetheless determine relevant political outcomes like elections, popular support, and government transitions. Second, politicians are aware of these misattribution patterns and are often able to anticipate their electoral prospects well before elections. This reduces incumbents' incentives to maximize voter welfare, as anticipated by economic voting theories, and increases the likelihood of shirking, waste, and corruption
• 書誌注記: Includes bibliographical references and index
• 所蔵機関: 国立国会図書館
• 請求記号: A251-D22
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立国会図書館 : 国立国会図書館蔵書; https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp
• 書誌ID（NDLBibID）: 030751503; http://id.ndl.go.jp/bib/030751503
• OCLC番号: 1202989432; https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1202989432
• 目録規則: RDA
• 整理区分コード: 211

• 内容細目: Introduction : representation in volatile economiesEconomic vote, exogenous shocks, and representationCan an economic vote promote representation?...