The volatility curse : exogenous shocks and representation in resource-rich democracies

• Material Type: 図書
• ISBN: 9781108841795 hardcover; 1108841791 hardcover; 9781108795357 paperback; 1108795358 paperback
• ISBN (error code): 9781108898072 electronic book
• Title: The volatility curse : exogenous shocks and representation in resource-rich democracies
• Author/Editor: Daniela Campello, Cesar Zucco
• Author Heading: Campello, Daniela, 1970-; Zucco, Cesar, Jr
• Publication, Distribution, etc.: Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press (出版)
• Publication Date: 2021; 著作権日付 : ©2021
• Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2021
• Extent: xix, 239 pages
• Other physical details: illustrations
• Size: 24 cm
• Place of Publication (Country Code): GB
• Text Language Code: eng
• Content Type: text
• Media Type: unmediated
• Carrier Type: volume
• Subject Heading: Elections--Economic aspects--Latin America; Voting--Economic aspects--Latin America; Democracy--Economic aspects--Latin America; Democracy--Economic aspects.; Economic history.; Elections--Economic aspects.; Politics and government.; Voting--Economic aspects.; Latin America--Economic conditions; Latin America--Politics and government; Latin America.
• LCC: JL968
• DDC: 324.98
• NDLC: A251
• Target Audience: 一般
• Note (Content): The Volatility Curse examines the conditions under which economic voting can (and cannot) function as a mechanism of democratic accountability, challenging existing theories that are largely based on experiences in developed democracies. Drawing on cross-national data from around the world and micro-level evidence from Latin America, Daniela Campello and Cesar Zucco make two broad, related arguments. First, they show that economic voting is pervasive around the world, but in economically volatile developing democracies that are dependent on commodity exports and inflows of foreign capital, economic outcomes are highly contingent on conditions beyond government control, which nonetheless determine relevant political outcomes like elections, popular support, and government transitions. Second, politicians are aware of these misattribution patterns and are often able to anticipate their electoral prospects well before elections. This reduces incumbents' incentives to maximize voter welfare, as anticipated by economic voting theories, and increases the likelihood of shirking, waste, and corruption
• Note (Bibliography): Includes bibliographical references and index
• Holding library: 国立国会図書館
• Call No.: A251-D22
• Data Provider (Database): 国立国会図書館 : 国立国会図書館蔵書; https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp
• Bibliographic ID (NDL): 030751503; http://id.ndl.go.jp/bib/030751503
• OCLC No.: 1202989432; https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1202989432
• Cataloging Rule: RDA
• Bibliographic Record Category (NDL): 211

• Contents: Introduction : representation in volatile economiesEconomic vote, exogenous shocks, and representationCan an economic vote promote representation?...