Incentives and Social Preferences: Experimental Evidence from a Seemingly Inefficient Traditional Labor Contract

• Material Type: 文書・図像類
• Title: Incentives and Social Preferences: Experimental Evidence from a Seemingly Inefficient Traditional Labor Contract
• Author/Editor: 後藤, 潤; Sawada, Yasuyuki; Aida, Takeshi; Aoyagi, Keitaro
• Author Heading: 後藤, 潤; Sawada, Yasuyuki; Aida, Takeshi; Aoyagi, Keitaro
• Publication, Distribution, etc.: Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
• Publication Date: 2015-03
• Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2015-03
• Contributor: Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
• Text Language Code: eng
• Subject Heading: Randomized controlled trials; incentives; social preferences; peer effect; labor contract; field experiments
• Target Audience: 一般
• Format (IMT): application/pdf
• Source: fulltext; https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/28315/wp2014-12.pdf
• Access Restrictions: インターネット公開
• Related Material (URI): URI; http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/English/index.html
• Periodical Title: CEI Working Paper Series, No. 2014-12
• Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• Original Data Provider (Database): 一橋大学 : HERMES-IR(一橋大学機関リポジトリ) : Research & Education Resources

• Summary, etc.: This paper investigates the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in formulating rice planting contracts in the Philippines. In our s...