電子書籍・電子雑誌

Adverse selection versus moral hazard in financial contracting : evidence from collateralized and non-collateralized loans (RIETI discussion paper series 17-E-058)

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Adverse selection versus moral hazard in financial contracting : evidence from collateralized and non-collateralized loans(RIETI discussion paper series 17-E-058)

Persistent ID (NDL)
info:ndljp/pid/11349397
Material type
電子書籍・電子雑誌
Author
Uchida Hirofumiほか
Publisher
経済産業研究所
Publication date
2017-03
Material Format
Digital
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Material Type
電子書籍・電子雑誌
Title
Adverse selection versus moral hazard in financial contracting : evidence from collateralized and non-collateralized loans
Author/Editor
Uchida Hirofumi
Uesugi Iichiro
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry
Series Title
RIETI discussion paper series 17-E-058
Publication, Distribution, etc.
日本 : 経済産業研究所
Publication Date
2017-03
Publication Date (W3CDTF)
2017-03
Text Language Code
eng
Persistent ID (NDL)
info:ndljp/pid/11349397
https://dl.ndl.go.jp/pid/11349397
Collection
障害者向け資料