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Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
Paper文書・図像類
Kazumura, Tomoya, Mishra, Debasis, Serizawa, ShigehiroThe Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University2020-01Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers1001p.1-55
Other Libraries in Japan
  • Author HeadingKazumura, Tomoya Mishra, Debasis Serizawa, Shigehiro

Mechanism design without quasilinearity

Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Paper文書・図像類
Kazumura, Tomoya, Mishra, Debasis, Serizawa, ShigehiroThe Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University2017-06-08Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers1005p.1-61
Other Libraries in Japan
  • Author HeadingKazumura, Tomoya Mishra, Debasis Serizawa, Shigehiro

A Foundation for Dominant Strategy Voting Mechanisms

A Foundation for Dominant Strategy Voting Mechanisms
Paper文書・図像類
Mishra, DebasisThe Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University2014-11Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers916p.1-42
Other Libraries in Japan
  • Author HeadingMishra, Debasis

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